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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The \3tah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this "matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended,
pertaining to Appeals from District Courts involving domestic
relations cases.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Was the denial of Defendant/Appellant's Petition for

Conciliation, filed more than four (4) months after commencement of
the divorce action, abuse of discretion, amounting to error?
B.

Did the lower Court in exercise of its discretionary

authority, error by granting Plaintiff a divorce upon the grounds
of irreconcilable differences, a no-fault provision that does not
need fault to be proven.
C.

Whether the constitutionality of Section 30-3-1(h), Utah

Code Annotated, as amended, not raised or argued by Appellant in
the lower Court and raised for the first time on appeal, is
properly before the Utah Court of Appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard

of Review

discretion standard.

on this Appeal

is an abuse of

The trial Court has broad discretion in
1

ruling on a Petition for Conciliation.

Where the evidence in a

divorce action, with respect to grounds, is conflicting, but there
is sufficient evidence to support the lower Court's finding against
the Defendant, the Appellate Court will approve the lower Court
finding.

Anderson v. Anderson. 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943).

The Appellate Court should review the factual findings of the
trial Judge under the "clearly erroneous standard."

The trial

Court's Findings of Fact should not be disturbed unless such
findings are clearly erroneous.

Findings of Fact will be regarded

as clearly erroneous only if they are "so lacking in support as to
be against the clear weight of the evidence."

Hacren v. Hagen, 810

P.2d 478 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989) .

The Appellant must first marshall the

evidence which supports the finding and then demonstrate that,
despite this evidence, it is clearly erroneous.

Christensen v.

Munns, 812 P.2d 69,73 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
The constitutionality of 30-3-1(h), Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, is a presumption of validity standard.
Meiling, 87 Ut. 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935).

Lehi City v.

The legislative power is

vested in the Legislature of the State of Utah by virtue of Article
VI,

Section

1 of

the

Utah

Constitution.

Marriage

is a

relationship that may be created and terminated only with consent
of the State.

2

CONTROLLING STATUTES
A. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-1(h), as amended, which
provides as a grounds for divorce "irreconcilable differences."
B.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-13.1, et. seq., as

amended, enacted 1969 which provides that a Family Court Division
of the District Court may be established with consent of the County
Legislative body

and determination by the District Court that

social conditions in the County and the number of domestic relation
cases in the Courts require the procedures provided for in this
Act, (emphasis added)
C. Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 1, which states the
legislative power is vested in the Legislature (Senate and House of
Representatives) of the State of Utah, embodies the power to
regulate

marriage,

a

relationship

that

may

be

created

and

terminated only with the consent of the State.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This an Appeal from a Decree of Divorce granted to the
Plaintiff by the trial Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, upon
the ground of irreconcilable differences, and denial of Defendant's
Petition for Conciliation.

3

PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff (wife) filed this divorce action on November 14,
1995 (R. 1-9), and Summons was first served on Defendant, December
3, 1995. (R. 34)
Temporary

Custody,

The Summons and Order to Show Cause for
Support

and

Other

Relief, was

served

on

Defendant a second time on December 29, 1995, (R. 38-44) after
Defendant had filed a Motion to Quash the first service of process.
(R. 25-29)

Defendant filed his Answer to the Complaint on January

10, 1996 (R. 47-48).
Hearing on Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was held on
February 1, 1996, with an Order entered on the Order to Show Cause,
March 4, 1996.

(R. 71-77)

The Guardian Ad Litem appointed by the

Court to determine the allegations of abuse of the minor children,
filed her report with the Court on May 20, 1996.

(R. 80-86)

It

was her belief that the children were not being neglected or
abused.

However, she determined that the children did not have a

good relationship with their father (Defendant).
Certification of Readiness for Trial was filed on March 25,
1996, (R. 99) after completion of discovery by Plaintiff.
(R. 49; 68)

Defendant, after Notice of the Pre-trial Settlement

Conference, filed a Petition for Conciliation on April 17, 1996,
(R. 101-103) although he had not yet attended the Divorce Education
Course.

Defendant's Petition for Conciliation was denied by

Domestic Relations Commissioner, Lisa A. Jones, at the Pre-trial
4

Settlement Conference. (R. 104; 131)

Defendant objected to the

Commissioner's denial of his Petition for Conciliation. (R. 121126)

The case having been certified to Judge Sandra N. Peuler,

for trial, an Order scheduling a Pre-trial/Settlement Conference
for July 15, 1996 was sent by the Court.

(R. 133-134)

There

being no settlement, a trial date of September 6, 1996 was set by
the Court.

(R. 135-136)

Defendant

filed

his Notice

to

Submit

for

Decision his

Objection to denial of his Petition for Conciliation on July 30,
1996 (R. 151-152)

The Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler,

denied Defendant's Objection by written and signed Minute Entry,
August 22, 1996 (R. 150-153) and the Order thereon (R. 226-227).
The case came on for trial, as scheduled, September 6, 1996,
and was tried.

(R. 156-157)

Defendant, on the morning of trial,

filed an untimely handwritten letter with the Court. (R. 159-225;
T. 284)

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, with the Decree

of Divorce, was filed on October 22, 1996 and entered by the Court.
(R. 241-269) .

Notice of Entry of Judgment was sent and filed with

the Court, November 5, 1996.

(R. 270-271)

A Notice of Appeal was

filed by Defendant on November 7, 1996. (R. 272-273)

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, after evidentiary
hearing, made findings and concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to
5

be granted a Decree of Divorce, upon the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. (R. 242-243; T. 293-303; 504-505)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The parties were married August 4, 1978 at Salt Lake City,
Utah, and separated August 14, 1995. (T. 292)
2.

Three (3) children were born issue of the marriage and

Defendant agreed that Plaintiff should be the custodian and awarded
custody of the children.
3.

The

parties

(R. 2; 47; T. 304-305)
had

been

experiencing

problems

and

difficulties in the marriage for a little over three (3) years
before Plaintiff filed her Complaint for divorce, that began after
Defendant

lost

his

job

in

the

fall

of

1991.

Defendant

acknowledged that there were problems and difficulties in the
marriage, which he characterized as the "real problems" for which
they sought counselling.

(T. 376-377; 450-451)

4. The parties had been engaged in marriage counselling with
Dr. Victor Cline prior to the time Defendant separated
Plaintiff and the minor children.

(T. 295-296)

from

Defendant left

Plaintiff and the children without financial resources or support
and stayed away for approximately 2 1/2 months.

Plaintiff was not

employed at the time and had not worked out of the home during the
marriage.

Defendant did not send money to support them, which was

very hard on Plaintiff and the family, physically and emotionally.
6

(T. 298-300)

Although the parties had engaged in counselling

prior to Defendant separating from Plaintiff, they were unable to
resolve the marital problems and difficulties that continued to the
time of trial.
5.

(T. 353-355; 358-371)

Plaintiff testified to many of the problems she had

experienced during the marriage to Defendant that could not be
reconciled.

She testified Defendant was controlling, critical of

her and the children, very domineering, preaching to her which made
her feel degraded and unworthy, all of which the Court found
sufficient in terms of grounds for granting the divorce.
303; 504-505)

(T. 294-

Defendant acknowledged that Plaintiff was unhappy

in the marriage and had expressed to him that he was domineering,
controlling and judgmental.
6.

(T. 403; 450-452)

Defendant has sought to place the source and blame of the

parties unresolved problems and difficulties to unnamed others.
(T. 398; 406; 423)

Defendant did not attend the Divorce Education

class and declined to continue marriage counselling after the
separation (T. 353-354).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
DENIAL OP DEFENDANTS PETITION FOR CONCILIATION
BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS DISCRETIONARY AND NOT ERROR
Defendant/Appellant filed his Petition for Conciliation on
7

April 17, 1996, more than four (4) months after commencement of the
action and after Notice of the Pre-trial Settlement Conference
before Domestic Relations Commissioner, Lisa A. Jones. (R. 101-103;
105-106)

The Third District Court had not established a Family

Court Division, nor appointed a Domestic Relations Counselor. (See
Section 30-3-15.1, U.C.A. Amended)

Section 30-3-13.1, Utah Code

Annotated, as Amended, provides:
A Family Court Division of the District Court may be
established with the consent of the County Legislative
body in a County in which the District Court determines
that the social conditions in the County and number of
Domestic Relations cases in the Courts require use of
the procedures provided for in this Act, in order to
give full and property consideration to such cases and
to effectuate the purposes of this Act.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-15.2 of the Family Court Act
relating to powers of Domestic Relation counselors, had been
repealed, effective April 27, 1992.

Absent the establishment of

a family Court division by the Third District Court and the
appointment

of

a

Domestic

Defendant's

Petition

for

Relations

Conciliation

counselor,
by

denial

Domestic

of

Relations

Commissioner, Lisa A. Jones, and thereafter, Judge Sandra N.
Peuler, denying Defendant's Objection to the Commissioner's Order,
was proper, under the circumstances

existing

discretionary authority provided by the Act.

and within the

Section 30-3-16.7,

U.C.A. of the Act, provides for a stay of a pending action, when a
Petition for Conciliation is filed, for a period of sixty (60)
days,

unless

the

Court

otherwise
8

orders.

(emphasis

added)

Assuming

the

District

Court had

established

a

Family

Court

Division, and appointed a Domestic Relations counselor, Section
30-3-17, U.C.A. of the Act, "POWER AND JURISDICTION OF JUDGE"
clearly provides discretionary authority to the Court with regard
to

filing

a

Petition

for Conciliation

and

with

respect

to

recommending the aid of a psychiatrist, psychologist or other
specialist, or a religious representative by use or the word "MAY"
adding, "the power and jurisdiction granted by this Act shall be in
addition to that presently exercised by the District Court's and
shall not be in limitation thereof." (emphasis added)

The Court

of Appeals, in rendering its decision in A.E. v. Crstan, 13 Ut.
Adv. Rep. 3, at page 5, cited the Utah Supreme Court case of
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Salt Lake County. 575 P.2d 705
(Utah 1978) and acknowledged that the term "shall" may be either
discretionary or mandatory.
30-3-16.7, U.C.A.

of

It is clear from reading of Section

the Act, use

of

the

word

"shall" is

discretionary where the District Court is given the authority and
alternative to, "otherwise order."

Use of the word "may" in

Section 30-3-17, U.C.Ac of the Act, is a clear indication of the
discretionary authority given to the Court.

Where, as here, the

Third District Court had not established a Family Court Division,
nor

appointed

a

Domestic

Relations

counselor,

denial

of

Defendant/Appellant's Petition for Conciliation by the District
Court was proper, under the circumstances, and well within its
discretionary authority.
9

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT«S FINDING OP IRRECONGILABLE DIFFERENCES
IS SUPPORTED BY THE SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT TRIAL
As

a general

rule, the

trial

Court

discretion in domestic relation cases.

is

afforded

broad

When the Plaintiff

presents sufficient, substantial evidence to support grounds for
divorce, the Court should grant a divorce.
(supra)

All that

differences exist.

is required

Anderson v. Anderson

is that the

irreconcilable

Grosskopf v. Grosskopf. 672 P.2d 814 (Wy 1984)

Defendant's attack on the trial Court's ruling is a challenge
to the Court's findings of fact.

To successfully attack a finding

of fact, Defendant, as Appellant, must first marshall all the
evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that even if
viewed in the light most favorable to the trial Court, the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the finding.
Munns (supra);

Christensen v.

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Ut. 1989)

Legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined under Rule
52(a) U.R.C.P., which provides:
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence shall not be set aside
unless "clearly erroneous" and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial Court
to judge the creditability of the witnesses."

10

Richens v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. 817 P.2d 382 (Ut. Ct. App.
1991); Doelle v. Bradley (supra).

The finding of the trial Court

and its conclusion that irreconcilable differences existed between
the parties is supported by the trial transcript of Plaintiff's
testimony and that of Defendant.

During the marriage the

Defendant was controlling, emotionally abusive, critical of her,
being judgmental, preaching to her, causing her to feel unworthy.
(T. 294-295)

Defendant separated, voluntarily, from her and the

family in August, 1995, while the parties were engaged in marriage
counselling, staying away 2 1/2 months.

(T. 296)

At the time

Defendant separated, there was $5.00 in the checking account and
Plaintiff was not employed, she not having worked outside of the
home during the marriage.
support of the family.

Defendant did not send money for

She supported the family by holding a yard

sell and working two (2) jobs which was very hard physically and
emotionally.

(T. 298-299)

Defendant disapproved of her working

outside the home, stating by letter sent to her that she was
"condemned."

(T* 300)

Plaintiff's desire to continue working and

Defendant's disapproval of her working, continued and still existed
at the time of trial.

(T. 301; 469)

There were financial

differences that persisted throughout the marriage.
376; 381)

(T. 301; 365;

The trial Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, found

from all of the testimony and evidence presented, Plaintiff had set
forth sufficient basis for a divorce to be granted on the grounds
11

of irreconcilable differences.

That the differences included her

objection to Defendant's treatment of the children, his being
critical of her, preaching to her, and disagreement over how
finances were handled*
they

should

characterizes

live

That the parties have disagreed on how

their

lives.

the differences

Although

that existed

the

Defendant

to be minor, and

believes that the marriage can be reconciled, it takes two to make
that commitment.

The Court found that Plaintiff had concluded

that their differences are so great that no reasonable effort would
reconcile them.

(T. 504-505).

Defendant/Appellant has not marshalled the evidence in support
of the trial Court's findings or demonstrated that the evidence
supporting

the

findings

is legally

insufficient.

Although

Defendant provided conflicting testimony, a trial Court's factual
finding is deemed "clearly erroneous" only if it is against the
clear weight of the evidence.

Doelle v. Bradley, (supra).

The

challenged finding of irreconcilable differences is not "clearly
erroneous" and therefore no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial

Court

and

its

finding

and

ruling

of

irreconcilable

differences should not be disturbed.

POINT III
DEPENDANT/APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT SECTION 30-3-1(3)(h)
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED# AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IS WITHOUT MERIT
12

The issue of the constitutionality of Section 30-3-1(3)(h),
U.C.A. was not plead or raised by Defendant at trial.

To preserve

an issue for Appeal, a party must timely bring the issue to the
attention

of

the

trial

Court, thus

providing

the

Court

an

opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. Lebaron & Associates v.
NEC Information Systems, 823 P.2d 479 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991)

Turtle

Management. Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672
(Ut. 1982).

Issues not raised in the trial Court in timely

fashion are deemed waived, precluding the Appellate Court from
considering their merits on Appeal.

Salt Lake County v. Carlston.

776 P.2d 653, 655 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
The authority and power to regulate marriage and divorce is
with the State.
by statute.

The only grounds for divorce are those specified

Statutes providing for dissolution of marriage on

grounds of irreconcilable differences, have been held to be valid.
Defendant/Appellant has not provided legal authority to support his
position that Section 30-3-1(3)(h), U.C.A. is unconstitutional. In
fact, the Addendum attached to Defendant/Appellant's Brief at R.
175 states:
The validity of marriage dissolution statutes of this
nature (irreconcilable differences) has been attacked
in several instances on such grounds as improper
delegation of the legislative power, denial of due
process of law, impairment of the obligation of
contract and unconstitutional vagueness of statutory
language, but no dissolution of marriage act of
the type here under consideration has been held
invalid as of this writing (emphasis added)
Citing 21 ALR 2d 267 and 58 ALR 2d 1218
13

Defendant acknowledges this quote from his Addendum in his Brief at
page 29.

It appears from his Brief that he basis his claim of

unconstitutionality in part on religious grounds.

Defendant had

his day in Court and was afforded the due process guaranteed by the
Utah Constitution.

The Court, hearing all of the testimony

presented and in a position to judge the creditability of the
witnesses, determined that sufficient, substantial evidence had
been presented to support granting Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce on
the

grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences.

(T.

504-505)

Defendant's Appeal on this issue should fail and be rejected by the
Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing abuse of
discretion by a clear preponderance under the clearly erroneous
standard.

The

finding

and

ruling

of the trial

Court of

irreconcilable differences is supported by substantial, legally
sufficient evidence.

The denial of the Defendant's Petition for

Conciliation

District

by

the

Court

was

proper,

under

circumstances, and within its discretionary authority.
abuse of discretion, there is no error.

the

Absent

Defendant/Appellant,

having failed to plead or raise the constitutionality of Section
30-3-1(3) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, is deemed waived, precluding the
Appellate Court from considering this issue on its merits.
14

The

authority and power of the State to regulate marriage and divorce
is not in dispute.

The statutes providing for dissolution of

marriage on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, have been
held to be valid.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff having been awarded attorney's
fees in the lower Court, should be awarded attorney's fees for this
Appeal.

Defendant's Appeal of the lower Court's ruling and

decision should be denied in all particulars.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1997.

:#^D

iTPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSEI
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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